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Abstract 
Afghanistan is often characterised as a ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state in terms of state ‘functionality’, lacking 
in capacity to provide security and wellbeing to its citizens and failing to prevent violent conflict and 
terrorism. Since 2001, education has become a major victim of Afghanistan’s protracted crisis that 
involves international military interventions, fragile democracy and growing radicalisation. Drawing 
upon qualitative interviews with educational officials and practitioners in Afghanistan and critically 
examining the literature in education and conflict, we argue that Afghanistan’s education is caught in 
the nexus between deteriorating security conditions, weak governance and widespread corruption, 
resulting in rebel capture of educational spaces for radicalisation and violent extremism. More broadly, 
we contend that education faces the risk of capture for radicalisation in contexts where state fragility 
and fundamentalism intersect. Finally, we highlight some critical issues relating to educational 
programming in conflict-affected contexts. 
Keywords 
Education and conflict, Afghanistan, political economy, security and state-building 
Introduction 
Education in conflict-affected contexts can provide higher quality of life through economic wellbeing 
and improve political participation as a means to reduce underlying causes of conflict (Walter, 2004). 
Opportunities to participate in education reduce the likelihood of young people’s involvement in 
armed conflicts (Barakat and Urdal, 2009; Thyne, 2006) and higher levels of education increase the 
chances of economic opportunities and hence, provide youth a stable livelihood (Østby and Urdal, 
2010). Most importantly, education can support stability by promoting ‘resilience, communication 
and language skills, by teaching conflict resolution, and by giving predispositions to challenge 
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injustice’ (Davies, 2013: 2). However, in fragile environments, education is trapped in a complex 
political economy that undermines its role in enabling wider societal transformation. Yet, educational 
rebuilding in post-war societies tends to disregard political economy factors that undermine educa-
tional reforms as well as implicitly fuel conditions of conflict. Firstly, education systems can promote 
linguistic and cultural repression, biased history teaching, ethnic and gender-based exclusions, war 
and hate curriculum and inequity, both in terms of access and quality of education (King, 2014). 
Secondly, education is either outside the political project of post-war peacebuilding or is limited nar-
rowly to the agenda of economic development. Consequently, where reforms in education are 
planned, these predominantly focus on the customary processes of technical areas, such as rebuilding 
physical infrastructure, teacher training, increasing school enrolment, distribution of educational 
materials, school upgrade, assessment policies and teacher recruitment. While these reforms are 
important, they are unlikely to address the systemic problems in education that are likely to contribute 
to conflict. The purpose of this article is to analyse political economy of education in post-2001 
Afghanistan to highlight micro level political and economic dimensions that surpass the debates 
about technical reforms in education. It draws upon qualitative interviews with educational stake-
holders including government officials, development practitioners and civil society activists in 
Afghanistan (n = 31) as well as the experience of working with the Afghan government (2011–2015) 
to argue that education in Afghanistan is caught in the complex nexus between insecurity, widespread 
corruption and weak governance, fostering an environment for radicalisation. These findings provide 
important insights into processes of educational development in conflict-affected contexts where 
political economy dimensions in education interact with radicalisation and violent extremism. 
Firstly, we discuss education and conflict as a growing area of research and policy, followed by 
an analysis of political economy in the education sector. In the second part of the paper, we provide 
some contextual analysis of educational development in Afghanistan since 2001 from a conflict 
perspective. The third section will critically examine education in Afghanistan using a political 
economy framework (Department for International Development, 2002; Pherali, 2015). Finally, 
we conclude with some implications of our analysis to the wider field of education, conflict and 
international development. 
The contested role of education in conflict: a global debate 
Education as victim within conflict zones  
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and conclusion of the Cold War altered the nature of armed 
conflicts from ‘inter-state’ wars to ‘intra-state’ civil wars. These wars are now fought within the 
states and civilian habitats characterising, undemarcation of battlefields. According to the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015), violence has increased globally over the last 
decade, claiming 180,000 lives in 42 conflicts in 2014 alone, which is three times more than the 
death toll in 2008. In Afghanistan, 11,000 civilian deaths were recorded in 2015, and one in four of 
these have been children (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2015). Civilians, 
particularly children constitute the prime victim of wars and suffer enduring physical, psychologi-
cal, and socio-economic effects. The United Nations (UN) report states that ‘the physical, sexual 
and emotional violence to which children are exposed shatters their world. War undermines the 
very foundations of children’s lives, destroying their homes, splintering their communities and 
breaking down their trust in adults’ (Machel, 1996: 39). Civil wars have a debilitating impact on a 
country’s education system both in terms of decimating educational infrastructure and teaching 
workforce as well as cuts in educational spending as the military budget increases (Lai and Thyne, 
2007). As educational institutions represent state authority, rebels often target schools as defiance 
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to state control and more so, as a propaganda tool. Hence, teachers and children are not only caught 
in the middle of the conflict but also become tactical targets during civil wars (Global Coalition to 
Protect Education from Attack, 2014; van Wessel and van Hirtum, 2013). More notably, the most 
profound effect of civil wars on education ‘is on quality [of] rather than access to’ education, which 
poses serious challenges for post-war educational reconstruction (Buckland, 2005). 
Access to education as a means to conflict reduction? 
Low income countries are more susceptible to civil wars and conflict-prone countries are likely to 
be poor (Crocker and Hampson, 1996; Hoddie and Hartzell, 2005; Walter, 2002). Using a dataset 
involving 120 conflict-affected countries over thirty years, Brakat and Urdal (2009) find a signifi-
cantly positive correlation between large young populations, low levels of education, and the likeli-
hood of conflict. Similarly, the rebel recruitment thesis signifies that access to education increases 
the opportunity costs for youth to join armed groups as educational opportunities signal hope for a 
stable livelihood (Collier et al., 2004). Education is a trust-building tool between the government 
and its citizens, and a good quality education provides knowledge and skills to resolve conflicts 
peacefully. For instance, Ishiyama and Breuning (2012: 73–74) conclude that countries that have 
greater increases in educational access especially, higher education, in the period following the end 
of a conflict, are less likely to experience recurrence of conflict and a longer period of peace duration. 
However, this undermines the nature of educational contents, ideological positions of educational 
actors including teachers and in some contexts, extremist groups who control educational spaces 
and influence pedagogies. Even though formal education plays an important role in building and 
sustaining national identity and mitigating conflict through building resilient societies (Davies, 2011), 
it can equally play a socially destructive role by maintaining unequal access to education, offering a 
segregated and unjust educational provision, manipulating history and suppressing minority languages 
and cultures (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2005; Pherali, 2016: 3). 
Education as manipulation for polit ical means  
Despite being enshrined in numerous UN charters and treaties as a vehicle for freedom and prosperity, 
education is often manipulated by both state and non-state groups for their political motives. Narrowly 
defined to promote national identity and justify a political system, education is central to endeavours, 
ranging from ‘state formation’ (Green, 2013), to ‘communal empowerment’, to bolstering ‘self-
strengthening’ resistance to the encroachments of Western and/or imperialist influences, or at 
furthering projects of post-colonial nation-building or post-conflict peace-building (Lall and 
Vickers, 2009). The biased curricular contents, enforced by authoritarian states fabricate chauvinistic 
national identity that is repressive of and deceptive to diverse representations of civic lives (Pherali, 
2016: 4). For example, regimes in India and Pakistan revised their school curricula to teach 
contrasting historical narratives that would lead to fundamentalisation of national identities and 
antagonistic views towards each other’s nations (Lall, 2008). The assumption that an increased 
access to education may serve positively for conflict transformation is seriously flawed and hence, 
educational programming in conflict-affected contexts requires a critical appreciation of 
education’s contesting role in conflict and fragility (Gross and Davies, 2015). 
Securitisation of education in conflict -affected contexts 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq in 2004, new dynamics in the 
nature, volume and geographies of aid to education have emerged (Novelli, 2010). Despite  
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being discursively framed as ‘humanitarian interventions’ (Fearon, 2008: 52), the educational 
aid in conflict-affected contexts appears to be increasingly politicised along security interests 
rather than the fundamental learning needs of children (Novelli, 2010; United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 2011). Over the past decade, the East– 
West and state-centric cartography is being shifted to a much more complex, fluid and trans-
national picture, where ‘terror suspects’ reside within the borders of our own ‘friendly’ states, 
hence, the development work and education aid is becoming an integral part of global war on 
terror (Duffield, 2008; Novelli, 2010: 545). For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, educational 
aid is increasingly submerged under the counter-insurgency strategy with detrimental effects for 
both development work and personal security of development practitioners (Novelli, 2010: 
453). 
Education for peacebuilding 
Lately, much hope has been placed on education as peace-builder not just in neo-classical eco-
nomic terms that assume investment in education and economic growth as solutions to conflict, but 
also as a vehicle that facilitates peace, social justice, and democratisation processes (Lopes Cardozo 
and Shah, 2016; Milton and Barakat, 2016; Novelli et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2011). It could also 
be argued that the link between education and peacebuilding is empirically fragile and often being 
defined by immediate humanitarian needs, protection, and post-war reconstruction of education. 
However, there is a growing recognition of education as a complex process, located contextually 
in economic, cultural, political and social interactions with serious implications for educational 
programming in conflict-affected environments. This paper aims to deal with these dimensions of 
education drawing upon the case of Afghanistan. 
Methodology 
The paper draws upon qualitative interviews and focus-group discussions with key educational 
stakeholders including officials from the Afghan Ministry of Education and educational practi-
tioners representing nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in Kabul as well as provincial edu-
cation representatives, teachers and NGO workers who support education in Jalalabad, the 
provincial capital of Nangarhar. Nangarhar is one of the most strategically significant provinces 
in the country, linking Afghanistan with Pakistan through Kabul as well as the Southeast regions 
to the North bordering with Pakistan. In the last two years, Islamic State (IS) activities are 
increasing in the province. Recently, it was reported that 58 schools were closed due to IS threat, 
driving around 300,000 pupils out of school (European Asylum Support Office, 2016: 28). 
Fieldwork in Kabul and Nangarhar helped us to gain insights into complex political and security 
situations within school surroundings and understand a broad range of perspectives of educational 
stakeholders in the country. The data were transcribed into English and thematically analysed using 
the conflict analysis framework (Department for International Development, 2002; Pherali, 2015) 
to represent security, political, economic and social dimensions of education in Afghanistan. 
Enhanced by researchers’ critical reflections on their experience of intensive research in the 
area, this approach helped interactively to engage with participants’ conceptions and different 
viewpoints and generate new perspectives about interconnections between power and resources 
in the education sector (Bogdan and Biklen, 2006; Krueger, 1998). The findings from the 
qualitative interviews are discussed and reflected upon, drawing upon the researchers’ broad 
academic and professional engagement in Afghanistan and beyond in the area of political economy 
of education. 
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Education in conflict-affected contexts: a political economy 
analysis 
A political economy analysis plays a critical role in development planning and reforms in educa-
tion in all settings – especially, in contexts characterised by social, political, and economic divi-
sions (De Herdt et al., 2012; Kingdon et al., (2014); Novelli et al., 2014). Collinson (2003: 3) 
defines political economy analysis as ‘the interaction of political and economic processes in a 
society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the 
processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time’. In Afghanistan where 
ethno-regional elites continue to pit each other over state power and resources, a political economy 
analysis provides useful insights into challenges relating to education and social change. The current 
state of fragility and growing conflict among the Taliban, Islamic State (IS) and various ethnic groups 
involves struggles for political dominance and control over resources, which is leading Afghanistan 
to the brink of failure across public sectors including education (Goodhand, 2013; Sahar, 2014; 
Sahar and Sahar, 2015; Suhrke, 2013). The political economy in this sense encompasses the 
examination of ‘how the relationships between individuals and society and between markets and 
the state affect the production, distribution and consumption of resources’ (Novelli et al., 2014: 
10). This approach, aligns with the Marxist and critical political economy perspectives and explores 
causes and consequences of unequal and asymmetric power relations between social groups 
(Caporaso and Levine, 1992; Dasgupta, 1985). It engages with broader political and economic 
dimensions, which influence policy-making processes and deliberations. Hence, it seeks to emphasise 
both the influence of imperialism, war, social inequalities and injustices, and the relationships 
between state, capital and civil society on economic and political interactions as well as the 
potential for transnational solidarity to challenge unequal power relations (Cox and Sinclair, 1996; 
Duffield, 2001; Novelli et al, 2014; Robertson, 1995; Robinson, 1996). A critical political economy 
focuses on, as Fenton notes: 
... structural inequalities and the consequences for representation in power and access to consumption, 
and places issues of economic distribution at its centre. It prioritises the relationship between the economy 
and forms of democratic politics. (Fenton, 2007: 7) 
Golding and Murdock (1991: 15) argue that ‘different ways of financing and organising cultural 
production have serious consequences for the range of discourses and representations in the public 
domain and for audiences’ access to them.’ In educational terms, these concepts relate to educa-
tional goals, policies and practices that are concerned with access to education, quality of learning 
and teaching, language of instruction, curriculum, teacher recruitment and redeployment as well as 
resource allocation across ethnically and geographically diverse regions. 
Socioeconomic disparities tend to determine patterns of educational access in which privileged 
social groups access a better-quality education, secure influential positions in public realms, and 
control economic resources. In contrast, the conditions of marginality and exclusion faced by ethnic 
minorities, indigenous people, Dalits and women imperil their access to educational opportunities, 
political participation and ability to gain social mobility. Educational dynamics such as inequitable 
distribution of educational aid (Burde, 2014), divided schooling (Gallagher, 2004), linguistic and 
cultural repression through the medium of instruction (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000), and dominance 
of informal governance in educational management (Pherali et al., 2011) exacerbate drivers of 
conflict in fragile societies. 
Although most of the conflict-affected countries such as Burundi, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Somalia have been assisted by international organisations in their post-war ‘state-building’ and 
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‘peace-building’, the overall impacts in terms of improving security, and promoting development 
remain mixed (Berdal and Zaum, 2013). Post-war transitions are often prolonged and rebuilding is 
particularly slow which delays tangible outcomes in securing long-term peace and bringing about 
positive changes in people’s life conditions. This is notably manifested through competing interests 
and values held by international and local actors that focus around the agenda of free market econ-
omy, national identity in cultural and political terms and geopolitical interests of donor countries in 
the process of war-to-peace transitions (Berdal and Zaum, 2013: 3; Goodhand, 2002). The post-war 
reconstruction often exploits the condition of state fragility, where the relationships between the 
state, society and the market are ruptured, to impose assertive neoliberal policies, involving privati-
sation of services and deregulation of market activities (Klein, 2008). The rapid growth in the edu-
cational sector especially, private schools and higher education institutions in post-war societies 
represents an expression of market liberalisation which Klein (2008) calls ‘the shock doctrine’ – that 
neoliberal capitalism exploits the public’s disorientation following massive collective shocks such 
as wars, terrorist attacks, or natural disasters – to achieve control by imposing economic shock 
therapy. 
Afghanistan’s educational progress amid violent conflict  
Modern education in Afghanistan has a turbulent history due to significant political upheavals, 
religious extremism, and ideological contentions of both internal and international players who 
have been at the centre of the country’s efforts for democratisation and development. Since the 
Western style education was introduced in Afghanistan about a century ago in a bid to modernise 
the country by embedding scientific thinking in the curriculum (Baiza, 2013; Gregorian, 1970), 
education has suffered manipulation and exploitation for ideological purposes in the backdrop of 
unstable political systems inspired by contesting political ideologies, ranging from communism to 
religious fanaticism. 
Nevertheless, education is the only hope for people who are caught in protracted crises such as 
military occupation (Pherali and Turner, 2017), refugee situation or forced displacement (Dryden-
Peterson, 2011). In Afghanistan, a country that has been shattered by protracted conflict, people 
value a good quality education as a pathway to social and economic development and to escape 
from the conflict trap (Burde, 2014). Yet, a recent survey revealed that out of a total population of 
30 million, 54.5% of Afghans have no formal or home schooling, with a significant gender gap of 
37.8% of men with no formal schooling as compared to 69.3% of the Afghan women (The Asia 
Foundation, 2015). Afghans in urban areas (80.1%) were found to be more satisfied with the current 
provision of education than those who lived in rural areas (63.7%). More worryingly, satisfaction 
with education has decreased in all regions in 2015 as compared to 2014 and a clear majority of the 
youth cite unemployment (71.4%) as the most critical problem they face. According to the National 
Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (2011–2012), Afghanistan is the second youngest nation in the 
world only after Uganda with over 50% of its population under the age of 15 (The Asia Foundation, 
2015). The report notes that around 13% (1.2 millions) of children in Afghanistan can be classified as 
child labourers. As the largest state employer (67%) that attracts merely 15% of the national 
budget, the system is under enormous pressure to accommodate the increasing number of school 
graduates in the university system. It is estimated that the number of grade 12 school graduates will 
double from 225,000 in 2014 to 451,000 in 2019, putting pressures on the already crippling higher 
education sector or the job market that also suffers from ongoing violence and insecurity (The Asia 
Foundation, 2015). 
After the removal of the Taliban government by the US-led invasion, efforts have been made for 
the expansion of educational opportunities for Afghan children and young people. Many national 
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and international organisations such as the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund, Asian 
Development Bank, Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, Independent High Commission on 
Education for Afghanistan, and the Academic Council on Education in collaboration with the gov-
ernment of Afghanistan have implemented programmes for rebuilding the education sector (Baiza, 
2013). The new Constitution of Afghanistan which was ratified in 2004 (Articles 17, 44, 45, and 
46) stipulates that 9 years of basic education would be compulsory for all Afghan children (6–15 
years) who would be taught a unified national curriculum. Education in state schools and institutions 
would be free up to the university level (Samady, 2013). The National Development Strategy (2006–
2010), adopted in 2006, also envisages a significant expansion of basic education, university 
studies, teacher and vocational training. Subsequently, the Education for All agenda became an integral 
part of National Priority Programmes, followed by the National Education Strategic Plans (Phase I: 
2006–2010; Phase II: 2010–2015; and Phase III: 2015–2020) that primarily focused on six major 
areas of educational reforms: general and Islamic education; curriculum development; teacher 
education; science and technology education; technical and vocational training; and education 
management (Ministry of Education, 2015). These policies overall emphasise on Afghanistan’s ambition 
to be ‘actively engaged with the rest of the world’, and to ‘provide equal access to quality education for 
all to enable people to participate and contribute productively to the development, economic growth 
and stability’ in Afghanistan (Ministry of Education, 2015: 46). 
In 2002, an estimated 900,000 boys attended school, while women and girls were almost completely 
excluded from educational opportunities (Ministry of Education, 2015). Since the fall of the Taliban, 
the Afghan government, in support with its development partners, has built or reinstated more than 
16,000 schools, recruited and trained nearly 200,000 teachers, and increased net enrolment rates for 
school-aged children past 56% (Ministry of Education, 2015). Currently, more than 9.1 million 
students, including more than 2.5 million girls are enrolled in school. However, another 1.5 million 
school-aged children are still out of school because of violent conflict, lack of adequate educational 
infrastructures, and severe poverty (Ministry of Education, 2015). There is an emphasis on fostering 
national unity and social cohesion through education as well as a commitment to the global agenda 
of Sustainable Development Goals, with an ambitious target of enrolling 14 million students 
including 6.5 million girls in 22,000 schools and employing 486,000 teachers (50% female) by 
2020 (Ministry of Education, 2015). 
Children and young people now spend 8.1 years on average at school as compared to 2.5 years 
ten years ago while the literacy rate among youth has also increased with female and male literacy 
rising from 29% and 43% in 2005 to 48% and 64% in 2012 respectively (National Risk and 
Vulnerability Assessment, 2011–2012). The number of state and private institutions of higher edu-
cation also rose drastically from only 5 public institutions in 1995 to 34 public and 101 private 
institutions in 2015. Similarly, the number of students in universities has soared from an estimated 
7,800 in 2001 to around 300,000, including around 100,000 women who are currently enrolled in 
public and private universities (USAID, 2017). The government also initiated the Education 
Quality Improvement Programme (EQUIP) I & II in 2008, with a broad objective of increasing 
access to quality basic education, especially for girls, through school grants, teacher training, and 
strengthened institutional capacity with the support of communities and private providers 
(Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016). Until the closing date of EQUIP II in December 
2016, a total of USD437 million has been invested in this programme (Lahire, 2015). 
As impressive as these facts and figures might appear against the backdrop of a country that 
inherited in 2001 an abysmal human development index and tattered educational system, the real 
success needs to be gauged against the progress that the Afghan government can make from 2015 
and later. Firstly, security concerns are still paramount which significantly jeopardise rebuilding of 
public services such as education. After 15 years of engagement, the international community is 
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withdrawing its combat troops, leaving the country’s political and economic fate in the hands of 
Afghans, with serious security concerns. For example, 2015 was the bloodiest year on record since 
2001 for the Afghan security forces that are stretched farthest to actively engage in clashes with the 
Taliban and IS. General John Campbell, the top US commander in Afghanistan, reported before the 
US Senate that 2015 saw a tough fighting season and the country would face ‘a tenuous security 
situation’ in the spring of 2016 when the new offensive season begins (cited in Bowman, 2016). 
The mounting influence of IS across the country has put an additional security burden on all parties 
engaged militarily inside Afghanistan, and on the regional players to recalibrate their security 
agendas – thus, culminating into a further regional security crisis. 
Secondly, weak governance is increasingly a major challenge amid growing insecurity. The 
2015 Corruption Index has placed Afghanistan as the third of the ten most corrupt and most violent 
places in the world (Transparency International, 2015) which has resulted in a significant amount 
of reconstruction aid being wasted with serious repercussions for sustaining peace and develop-
ment. The nexus between insecurity and corruption has derailed the efforts of building state capacity 
to deliver public services and improving the system of governance. Thus, there is an increasing effect 
of ‘informal governance’ (Pherali et al., 2011) that utilises traditional power structures and patronage 
outside the formal government institutions. This situation has led to disconnection between the 
legitimate state and the periphery, where most Afghans live (Barfield and Nojumi, 2010). The 
shrinking state presence and the growing influence of informal networks in the rural areas has meant 
that public trust in institutions such as security, health, justice, and education has significantly 
diminished, creating a breeding ground for armed groups such as Taliban fighters and IS. In this 
context, the local state authorities survive not because they are accountable to the public but because 
they maintain a balanced relationship between the central authority and regional/local level patronage 
networks. Particularly, ‘the middle and low-rank government officials privilege their short-term 
personal gains over long-term investment in the system’ (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 
Unit, 2016: 25). 
A political economy analysis: power and education in Afghanistan  
Historically, education in Afghanistan has functioned as a ‘catalyst’, ‘perpetrator’ and, has also 
become ‘victim’ of violence (Pherali, 2016). The communist regime (1978–1992) supported by 
the Soviets, concentrated on educational reforms that were primarily aimed at building socialist 
political foundations rather than responding to the fundamental needs of the country. The text-
books circulated in the state-administered schools, colleges and universities, relentlessly advo-
cated for atheism, women’s rights and gender equality. Belton (2009: 198) states that ‘the 
communist regime placed education in the vanguard of its campaign to unify, modernise and 
render socialist what it viewed as a backward, fragmented and excessively religious society’. 
The teachers were directed to teach and disseminate Soviet–Afghan friendship, and Russian 
language courses and new textbooks were introduced, presenting lessons within a Marxist-
Leninist framework. On the other hand, the resistant factions manipulated education to galvanise 
jihad against the Soviets and mobilise people along religious ties. The United States and some 
Gulf States provided intensive financial resources and technical support to develop textbooks that 
would promote an Islamic jihad against the Soviet occupation. These texts had little educational 
values except for violent jihad and disseminating ideological interests – thus creating 
antagonistic identities among Afghan youth (Burde, 2014). The literacy texts would start with 
‘A is for Allah. Allah protects all Muslims’; ‘J is for Jihad. Jihad is an obligation of all Muslims’; 
‘T is for topak (gun)’. Ahmed has a topak and conducts jihad with it against the Soviets’ 
(Textbook, grade 1). The mujahedeen used subjects as apolitical as mathematics as a 
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means of glorifying jihad, indoctrinating a generation with Islamic ideology and radicalisation. 
The state and its opponents deliberately promoted ‘hate education’ through which Afghan society 
was deeply militarised. This manipulation of education by two opposing political and religious 
ideologies (communism vis-à-vis Islam) led to the ‘fundamentalisation’ of national identities. 
The hijad (the war of resistance against the Soviets) and its international patrons added yet 
another dimension to education – that is, the process of Islamising education by replacing a 
substantial part of mathematics and scientific education with religious education (Burde, 2014). 
Since 2001, education has been a space of political scuffle between Kabul and the anti-government 
forces, which include the conservative mullahs, criminal gangs and local warlords, especially the 
Taliban. One participant in Nangarhar province lamented that: 
Educational institutions are the battle grounds of ideas between different, conflicting actors; lucrative 
sources of money and; influential agencies in communities. (Senior education manager, Nangarhar 
province) 
In order to control educational institutions for the above purposes, the anti-government forces 
carry out violent attacks on schools, teachers, students, and administrators (Burde, 2014; Giustozzi 
and Franco, 2013; Glad, 2009). The Taliban perceive education as a key field of state activity that 
undermines Afghan identity and cultural values (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016). 
According to the Ministry of Education (2015), typical attacks include bombings of buildings, 
arson, suicide bombings, and targeted killings of administrators, education aid workers and teachers. 
As schools are the most prevalent institutions representing state authorities, they have become an 
easy target for the Taliban who defy the authority of the government in Kabul. A key member of the 
Afghan government reported that: 
. . . as many as 1005 schools in 24 of the 34 provinces were closed in late 2016 due to increasing insecurity. 
This, in addition to other challenges in society [such as], early marriage and lack of female teachers, has 
excluded about 3.5 million children from access to education. Almost 75% of these out-of-school children 
are girls. (Deputy Minister of Education, Kabul) 
Another official also reported about attacks on schools and children that: 
. . . about 300 schools were destroyed during September and October 2016, 388 children were killed and 
1121 injured in conflict between January and June 2016. (Senior Adviser to the Education Minister, Kabul) 
In recent years, the Taliban insurgency has transformed into a problem concerning both political 
and military dimensions in which violence against education blatantly serves for both ideological 
and tactical objectives of the insurgency. Firstly, the Taliban claim that the new curriculum and text 
books induce ‘negative change’ by promoting un-Islamic education and Western values in the 
Afghan society. They have consistently demanded that the mujahedeen-era textbooks and Taliban 
approved religious texts be adopted and the schools where ‘Christianity is being taught’ be demol-
ished (Giustozzi and Franco, 2013; Rowell, 2014). Secondly, the Taliban intend to gain physical 
control over schools which serve for recruitment and military training. It would also serve for their 
ideological campaign to gain wider public support. The attack on schools is also a war tactic to 
undermine government legitimacy and decimate the link between the state and wider periphery. In 
December 2006, the Taliban leadership issued a layeha (Bill) that authorised attacks on schools 
that used new textbooks (Glad, 2009; Rowell, 2014). The layeha contained a detailed procedure 
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and stages of conduct that ranged from administration of warning, physical beating and arson 
attacks on schools to the killing of educational staff. An educational officer lamented that: 
Taliban have banned the teaching of social and cultural studies such as music and arts in schools, claiming 
that these subjects are un-Islamic and promote the Western culture and values. (Education manager, 
Nangarhar province) 
To ensure that schools adhere to the Taliban’s code of conduct, each school has at least one teacher 
who reports to the Taliban on a regular basis (Ruttig, 2011). A senior educational official in 
Nangarhar mentioned that: 
Taliban have representatives in all school protection councils who also closely monitor school management 
processes, participate in staff recruitment and facilitate the recruitment of Taliban affiliates to all available 
vacancies. (Senior education officer, Nangarhar province) 
An interviewee at a development partnership office also stated that: 
Before awarding a contract to a construction company to build or repair school buildings in areas 
controlled by Taliban, we seek the approval of Taliban for that company – otherwise the Taliban would not 
allow the work to go ahead. (An education officer working with an international NGO, Jalalabad city) 
It was found that public institutions in rural areas are still under the control of the Taliban. Schools 
and educational authorities seriously lack in public accountability and there are concerns about 
rising corruption, rent-seeking and nepotism in the educational sector, and the allocation of 
resources tends to be utilised to perpetuate patronage networks rather than improving educational 
activities. A political leader who had formerly served in the government reported: 
In [the] education sector, all stakeholders including teachers, students, parents and ministers are 
interconnected and interdependent. They collectively create and build mutual interests and protect these 
mutual interests. President Karzai once appointed an illiterate man yet powerful to the provincial education 
directorate in the province of Uruzgan. This man was extremely keen on this position as this position could 
help him influence the whole province. President Karzai accepted him, as in return, Karzai needed the 
support of the people to bolster his own patronage networks. (Former Minister of Education, Kabul) 
Burde (2014) notes that there is a growing concern about ‘elite capture’ of resources and decision-
making in the education sector. Corruption in school construction, teacher recruitment, and main-
taining ‘ghost’ schools and staff are systemic problems in Afghan education. A participant during 
our research also stated: 
[The nexus of] Insecurity, corruption, nepotism and politicisation of education has destroyed the education 
sector. The access and quality are rapidly shrinking. (Local civil rights activist, Jalalabad city) 
Another official who is affiliated to the government mentioned that: 
Two of the former education ministers who intended to run in the presidential elections used the education 
sector as an effective tool of accessing and influencing the public and extending their patronage network. 
On a single account, the MoE [Ministry of Education] awarded 60 diplomas to MPs [members of 
parliament] who had never attended schools. Education sector is dead. (A senior adviser to the Ministry 
of Education, Kabul) 
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The Ministry of Education (2015) has also noted that they frequently receive complaints about 
nepotism and favouritism in school resource allocation and decision-making. However, the patronage 
pyramids also constitute educational authorities that maintain symbiotic power and economically 
beneficial relationships between institutions at all levels such as provincial/district level educational 
offices, school management committees and teachers and parents (Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit, 2016). The education sector is lucrative as it is the single largest state employer 
and serves as an influential ‘vote bank’ during elections. The ruling party has a political advantage 
in teacher recruitment, which has resulted in increased politicisation of education (Giustozzi and 
Ali, 2010). There is also ethnic monopoly on curricular selection and unbalanced representation of 
Afghanistan’s diversity. A senior government official mentioned that: 
The curriculum favours history and culture of certain ethnic groups by ‘exaggerating’ their past while 
‘downplaying’ the role other ethnic groups have played in nation-building and democratisation processes. 
(Deputy Minister of Education, Kabul) 
Educational institutions in post-2001 Afghanistan have yet again become a major site for transmitting 
political ideologies and recruiting new members. Schools are prominent sites for political campaigns 
such as political debates, distribution of political literature, open protests and demonstrations which 
sometimes turn into violent scuffles. More ominously, 89.1% of students surveyed across ten 
provinces reported that they had personally witnessed Islamic groups such as Hizb-i Islami, Jamiat-
ul Islah (Salafis), Hizb-ut Tahrir, Taliban and Jundullah operating at schools (see Afghanistan Research 
and Evaluation Unit, 2016). Using a conflict analysis framework in the education sector (Department 
for International Development, 2002; Pherali, 2015) and drawing upon our qualitative interviews, 
we present in Table 1 a multi-level political economy analysis of education in Afghanistan. 
Radicalisation in educational institutions 
Concerns about growing extremist ideology was a recurring theme in our interviews with key 
informants in the education sector. Zaman and Mohammadi (2014) also report that educational 
institutions including mosques and madrassas, schools, colleges, and universities are becoming 
primary sites of radicalisation. The extremist clergies, associated with larger Islamist groups, 
have extended their influence beyond the mosques and madrassas such as computer and 
English-language learning centres. For instance, in several poor neighbourhoods of Mazar-e 
Sharif, extremist ideology was observed being taught alongside Excel and PowerPoint lessons 
(Fazli et al., 2015). Zaman and Khalid (2015) observe that militant groups such as the Taliban, 
Hizb-e Islami and IS extensively use social media as part of their broader campaign against the 
Afghan government and its allies – primarily targeting young students. Based on their study of 
radicalisation activities across eight university campuses, Zaman and Mohammadi (2014) conclude 
that while the universities did not play a direct part in the process, Islamist groups were strongly 
active in university campuses which are dominated by the Pashtun ethnic group. 
In Iraq, universities became literal battle grounds during 2005–2007 when Anbar University 
campus was controlled by Al Qaeda (Milton and Barakat, 2016) and universities generally ‘wit-
nessed the radicalization of the student body as differing ideologies compete for ascendency and 
influence on campus’ (Latif, 2006: 3). Some participants in our interviews also mentioned that 
students under the dominance of radical Islamic ideology would display negative views about 
human rights, gender equality, liberal democracy, foreign troops’ presence in Afghanistan, secular 
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education and women’s rights. Hence, radicalisation in educational institutions appears to be 
increasing amid weak governance and security failures across Afghanistan. 
Conclusion: a way forward in education in Afghanistan and other 
conflict-affected contexts 
The scale of politicisation and ideological influence on young people in schools, madrassas and 
universities seems to suggest that the future of Afghanistan’s Western-backed liberal democracy is 
fragile and faces a serious threat of radicalisation. Our analysis shows that educational institutions 
are increasingly falling in the trap of political extremism not only at the expense of children’s right 
to gain quality education but also putting the long-term peace of the country in jeopardy. In this 
context, educational programming that undermines complex social, political, economic and security 
dimensions of Afghan society is likely to not only fail but also exacerbate conditions of conflict. 
Insecurity, corruption and weak governance are the three most prevalent challenges for educa-
tional development in Afghanistan. Children, teachers and educational officers face serious secu-
rity threats from armed groups such as the Taliban and IS who reject modern education that aims 
to provide Afghan children with a global outlook, critical thinking and knowledge and skills to 
engage in economic activities in the era of globalisation. Firstly, schools in Afghanistan need to be 
located in the historical context of Afghanistan’s forty yearlong ‘war ideologies’ which continues 
to be a dominant feature even today. The growing influence of radical Islam on schools exacerbates 
Afghanistan’s already crumbling education sector and adds to the country’s state fragility. Secondly, 
corruption has increased significantly in Afghanistan in recent years (Transparency International, 
2016; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012) and the education sector is no exception 
(Hall, 2011). The widespread poverty in rural areas and rapid processes of educational decentrali-
sation that provide schools and local school management committees with direct access to educa-
tional funds often result in ‘pervasive, petty corruption that permeates the day-to-day transactions 
at the classroom, school, and district levels’ (Chapman, 2002: 3). Finally, weak governance at the 
state level is manifested through disconnection between administration and the justice system as 
well as between and within the Afghan government and the international community on the ele-
ments of the administrative system. As Nijat notes: 
Weak legislative and research capacity, over-politicized legislation, the inability of the governance 
machinery to operate as one system as opposed to separate and disconnected units, patronage and political 
interference in technical decision-making, an internally divided civil service, harmful urban-focused 
reform implementation and insecurity will continue to challenge good governance. (Nijat, 2014: 3) 
As we have shown above, these problems extensively permeate the education system across all 
administrative levels. The nexus between insecurity, corruption and weak governance also manages 
to sustain the failing administrative system through a mutually beneficial relationship in which 
one fuels the other. For example, insecurity contributes to corruption and weak governance whereas, 
the weak governance is the cause of corruption which erodes public trust on state institutions such as 
education. 
In post-2001 Afghanistan, due to explicit violent insurgency, national and international responses 
have focused mostly on the military dimension while little attention has been paid to educational 
dimensions that interact with elements of violence and radicalisation. Radicalism unlike terrorism, 
has social dimensions and a potential to create an environment that would lead to the formation of 
societies where acts of terrorism find some sympathy and degree of support (Taşpınar, 2009).  
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Education can serve as a fertile ground for cultivating radical ideas that terrorist activities can capitalise 
on. Hence, thinking about education only in technical terms (e.g. teacher recruitment, school building, 
enrolment and textbook supply) and clinging on to the idea that more schools in Afghanistan would mean 
more peace is utterly flawed. What happens in schools and university campuses and the kind of learning 
that is taking place in classrooms and the outcomes that are being produced by educational investment 
are more pertinent questions in conflict-affected contexts. 
This paper has examined micro-level political economy factors of education in Afghanistan to 
demonstrate that education is caught in a complex interplay between security, political, economic 
and social dynamics. This analysis also provides some insights into other similar conflict-affected 
contexts where educational reforms face multiple barriers and often fail to cater for the needs of 
socially and economically disadvantaged populations. Firstly, the intersectionality between funda-
mentalism and state fragility produces a conducive environment for radicalisation through education. 
The weak governance, insecurity and corruption in the education system only fuel public distrust 
towards the state, creating a manipulative space for non-state actors. Secondly, in post-war societies 
where governance structures are either broken or yet to be fully established, the influx of international 
policy prescriptions can overwhelm local stakeholders and lead to negative repercussions. As the 
international promises of service delivery such as education and health meet with national 
incapacities to deliver them, it can only lead to public frustration and mistrust of the government, 
putting the fragile peace in jeopardy. Thirdly, in the context of ongoing violence where schools are 
deliberately attacked by armed groups, promoting the conventional notion of schooling can put 
children’s lives at risk (Pherali, 2016). Finally, without establishing effective accountability systems 
and building capacities of local stakeholders, devolution of school management responsibilities to local 
stakeholders can suffer ‘elite capture’, rent-seeking and corruption. These outcomes can be rather 
more prevalent in the context of poverty where people lack in adequate economic opportunities. 
Additionally, the local level educational initiatives may contradict with the political agenda of the 
elitist state and international authorities, which exposes the irony of the local ownership agenda. In 
other words, local initiatives are only endorsed if they conform to the donors’ agenda for 
‘development’. 
A good quality education has a prominent role in post-war peacebuilding – especially, in the 
long-term peace, development and social transformation. Hence, education should be an integral 
part of peace and development strategy of a post-war society so that approaches to improve security, 
political settlements and conflict transformation are supported through sustainable educational 
structures. The challenge is to find a balance between globally non-threatening educational practices 
at the local level and the ideologically non-intrusive global agenda for education in the contexts that 
have been affected by violent extremism. 
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